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AMERICAN TRADE LEGISLATION 0~, . .Jro 3 
A FURTHER WARNING BY MR DECLERCQ 
In a letter to Mr Clayton Yeutter, US Trade Representative, Mr 
WI I ty De Clercq, Member of the Commission with speclal 
responslbl llty for external relatlons and trade pollcy, warned 
that the adoption of protectionist measures by the US Congress 
would lead to slml tar measures being taken by the United 
States' partners and would Jeopardize the new round of GATT 
negotiations. The letter Is also being sent to the members of the 
Senate-House Conference which Is about to debate adoption of the. 
trade b I I I. 
Mr De Clercq pointed out that the Community's vltal Interests 
were at stake In this leglslatlon. The Community Is the United 
States' biggest trading partner and together they are the main 
protagonists on the lnternatlonal trade scene. They therefore 
bear much of the responslbll lty for the preservation of GATT, 
which has contributed to the greatest period of prosperity In the 
history of the west~rn world. Mr De Clercq added that If either 
the United States or the Community tried to turn the clock back 
to the trade restrictions and bi lateral Ism of the thirties, the 
world would rapldly become much a poorer and more dangerous 
place. In partlcular, all the five mitt Ion Jobs which depend on 
United States' exports would be threatened. 
Mr De c I ercq spec If I ed the aspec--k of the Trade BI I I wh I eh were of 
greatest concern to the Community. These Included : 
- the redlftnltlon of lnternatlonally agreed trade defence rules (anti-dumping and countervat I Ing duties), 
- potential restrictions on foreign Investment In the United 
States, 
- the concept of sectoral reciprocity, 
- the creation of new non-tariff barriers, 
- restrictions on the power of the executive In trade matters. 
Annex : detalls of the provisions of the Trade BI I I of concern to 
the Community. 
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AttACHHENt' 
The European Conwnunlty ls concerned abod~ the following provlslons 
in the trade btlls: 
t. Unllater•l action in defiance of internitional agreements 
to which the u.s. is a party 
A nU111ber of amendments to the U.S. trade laws would, If enacted, 
aMount to a unilateral re-interpretation of internationally agreed 
rules. They would contravene obligations entered Into by the U.S. ln 
previous rounds of negotiations. The Community would be faced with 
domestic pressures to take mirror action, to adopt mirror legislation, 
or to retaliate. It may be worth recalling in this context that in 
1980-85, when the U.S. dollar favoured U.S. exports to the EC, EC 
industry complaints against U.S. firms led to 21 findings of dumping, 
notably in the chemical and textile sector. 
Examples: 
• The Import surcharge to finance the TAA program. 
• Section 301 and its variations: retaliation against trading 
partners who fall to eliminate so-called unfair practices 
without prior authorization of the CATT Contracting Parties. 
In such cases, the affected country would be entitled to 
suspend the application of concessions or obligations vis-a-vis 
the U.S. 
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• With respect to AD/CVD law: 
the definition of countervailable subsidies (rejection of 
the concept of ''general availability" in favor of 
"specificity", introduction of concept of "commercial terms" 
for loans), 
- · the definition of "industry" and "like produc't" for 
processed agri~ultural pro~ucts, and the calculation of a 
subsidy in such cases, 
amendment to th~ definition of the Foreign Market Value in 
AD cases involving related importers, 
ex pans ion of the .scope of t~e AD/CVD laws to cover dumping 
of input products, government imports and duty-free imports 
under the Florence Convention and to treat leases as sales, 
private right o~ actio~ aliowing plaintiffs in dumping cases 
to recover damages, 
cross-cumulation in AD/CVD Jnjury determinations, 
• Provisional relief in escape clause cases prior to a finding of 
injury. 
• Denial of benefits of CATT Code on Government Procurement 
without prior GATT authorization, 
• Steel - unilateral changes in the coverage of the VRAs on steel 
and the origin ruies pertaining to such VRAs. 
2. 
• Expansion of the definition of "unfair r1t,ctlces" to cover · 
export targeting, or activities of State~trading firm~ under 
Section 301. 
• Quota auctioning following relief under Section 201. 
• Section 337 (removal,of injury provision ~akes the use ·of 
Section 337 even more objectionable). 
• Tariff reelasslflcatlon - silicone, casein, steel plates. 
Potential restrictions on foreign investment in the -U.S. 
Registration and disclosure requirements on foreign investors 
would be discriminat~r::r, cou.!d_.oblige them to disclose business 
strategies and therefore deter foreign investments. The proposal would 
be contrary to OECD Agreements to which the U.S. ls a party. Both the 
U.S. and the EC share an interest in discouraging discrimination against 
their firms in third markets. It would be an irony lf the U.S. were to 
impose a surveillance on foreign investments whlle simultaneously 
seeking to open foreign markets to U.S. investments In the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
3. Sector-by-Sector Reciprocity Requirements 
• Telecommunications: world trade ls founded on each country 
finding an overall balance with its trading partners; Uke 
death and taxes, sectoral imbalances are an unavoidable fact of 
l lfe. In any case, it ls the EC who has a deficit with the 
U.S. in telecommunications. Should the EC retaliate? Should 
the U.S take restrictive action on the basis of this bill, the 
EC would counter-retaliate. Furthermore, any U.S. action on 
tbe basis of sectoral reciprocity could trigger or further 
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encourage demands by the EC for similar action in cases where 
U.S. barri~rs to trade w~uld be higher than ours. Would the 
U.S. appreciate, for example, a European Wool Textiles 
Reciproci~y bill? Allow ~s to recall that in June 1987 the EC 
Conmlssion pvbllshed a "green paper" on telecofflfflunlcatlon 
services a~d equipment which reconwnends action ln the EC to 
effectively enhance free competition and deregulation in this 
sector. 
• Maritime Shipping: The EC stands ready to co-operate with the 
U.S. l~ the face of ~nil•teral restrictions by thitd countries. 
However, th~ U.S. should refrain from investigating foreign 
carriers without well-founded reasons to presume unfairness on 
the part of t~e carrier, ,nd should not adopt measures that 
would lead ~p cargo reservation l~ violation of the objectives 
sought by ~ot~ the U.S. a~d the EC. 
. . ! ' . 
4. New non-tariff barriers 
• Origin lab~lllng for foreign food lnaredlents: Food processors 
change the~r sources of sµ,pply, depending on availability and 
price. Origin labelling for ingredients would require constant 
changes in t~e label~. T~is is totally impractical. 
S. New limitations on U.S, trade negotiating authority 
! ; 
The U.S. and th~ European Community have played a major role in 
launching the Uruguay ~ound. ~owever, the credibility of the U.S. 
negotiators will be·serlously hampered if they are hamstrung in their 
abll ity to reach agre~111ents both on tariff and non-tariff matters, and 
lf they cannot ensure that the outcome of the negotiations will be 
considered promptly and without amendments by the legislative branch. 
6. Preatdentlel 4l1cretton tn tndtvldual trade cases 
the a~i•tint lnternatlon,t trading rult1 permlt the U.S. to t•ke 
restrictive action 1g1ln1t Imports under Article XlX (e1c1pt cl1uit) or 
Article XXlil (unfilr acts, for example) when thl• h11 been authorized 
by the Contr•ctlna P•rtle1 ln c11e1 where they cohtlder it to be 
Justified under CATT criterl•· In Article XIX cites tht 1ffect1d 
country l• entitled to suspend ~ha application of conce•1lon1 ot 
obllgetlons vl1-)~vls ·the U.S. where It consld•r• the action not to be 
Ju1tlfled. ln Article XXlll case• action without authorlzatlon 11 
OATT-tlleaal and the affected country would have a clear case for 
retaliatory action. 
The exlstlns Section 301-provlslons already permit the U.S. 
Administration - under national law - to violate these lntern•tlonal 
rules. The tr,de bill'• limits on the Prosldent•t waiver authority 
might oblt1e the Admlnl1tratlon to do so, partlcul•rly If tht timetable. 
fer re•chlna an aareement 11 unrealistically shortened. 
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